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Economical Litigation:
Kentucky's Answer to High Costs
and Delay in Civil Litigation
INTRODUCTION
"It is a fearsome thing to contemplate a justice system sup-
ported by all taxpayers, practical access to which is out of reach
for the great majority of people who need its services."' Yet many
people do fear that rising costs of civil litigation and delay result-
ing from protracted discovery processes and overcrowded doc-
kets are turning the American court system into an impractical
alternative for dispute resolution.2
The American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce
Court Costs and Delay (the Action Commission) was established
in response to this growing concern. 3 The Action Commission has
been working closely with advisory committees in several states,
including Kentucky, to develop and implement several programs
specifically designed to reduce the prohibitive costs and unneces-
sary delay which have recently plagued our court system. 4
1 Epstein, Reducing Litigation Costs for Small Cases, JUDcES" J., Spring 1981, at 9,
10.
2 See, e.g., id.; Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint
for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 227 (1978); Grossman,
Kritzer, Bumiller & McDougal, Measuring the Pace of Civil Litigation in Federal and
State Trial Courts, 65 JUDICATURE 86 (1981); Janofsky, A.B.A. Attacks Delay and the
High Cost of Litigation, 65 A.B.A. J. 1323 (1979); Lundquist, In Search of Discovery Re-
form, 66 A.B.A. J. 1071 (1981); J. Palmore, The Urgency of Economic Litigation (1980)
(unpublished manuscript).
3 The American Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and De-
lay (the Action Commission) was established in 1979 by then A.B.A. President Leonard
Janofsky. Middleton, Experiments Tackle Trial Delay, Costs, 67 A.B.A. J. 1096 (1981).
For a good discussion of the purpose behind the creation of the Action Commission, see
Janofsky, supra note 2, at 1324.
4 The Action Commission has been particularly interested in studying the effects of
simplified and differentiated discovery procedures, especially when combined with strong
case management. See Chapper, Limiting Discovery, JUDcES' J., Spring 1980, at 20, 22.
The Commission has worked closely with committees from at least three states-Califor-
nia, Colorado and Kentucky-in implementing various fast-tracking procedures and dis-
covery limitations.
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In September of 1982, the Kentucky Supreme Court, under
the leadership of former Chief Justice John S. Palmore, 5 and with
the support of the Action Commission, 6 adopted the Special
Rules of the Circuit Court for the Economical Litigation Docket
(the Special Rules) .7 The Kentucky Economical Litigation
Docket consists of all cases involving contracts, personal injury,
property damages, property rights and the termination of paren-
tal rights.' These actions will be subject to special procedural
rules which provide for mandatory discovery and pre-trial con-
ferences, 9 telephone conferences 0 and limited discovery." Thus,
the docket brings about a number of substantial changes in Ken-
tucky civil procedures.
Although the Special Rules presently apply only to cases
brought in the Seventeenth Circuit (Campbell County),12 the
In January of 1978, California put the Economical Litigation Pilot Project into ef-
fect. The special rules apply to the Fresno Superior and Municipal Courts, the Los Angeles
Municipal Court and the Torrance Branch of the Los Angeles Superior Court. See CAL.
MrN. CT. R. 1701-51; CAL. SUPER. CT. R. 1801-59. The California project consists mainly
of discovery limitations which apply to cases in which the amount in dispute is less than
$25,000. For detailed examinations of the program, see Chapper, supra; Epstein, supra
note 1; McDermott, Equal Justice at Reduced Rates, 20 JUDcEs' J., Spring 1981, at 16.
The "Special Provisions Regarding Limited and Simplified Discovery" were im-
plemented in Colorado in July of 1981. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 26.1. The rules apply state-
wide upon request by any party. Like the California rules, the Colorado provisions con-
tain limited discovery procedures.
In December of 1980, Kentucky began an experimental program in the Campbell
County Circuit Court. For further discussion of this project, see notes 17-29 infra and ac-
companying text.
5 Former Chief Justice John S. Palmore has been the driving force behind the de-
velopment and implementation of Kentucky's special rules. His involvement in the pro-
gram is discussed further in notes 17 & 18 infra and accompanying text.
6 The Action Commission helped to set up the experimental program in Campbell
County Circuit Court and monitored the drafting of the Special Rules. See the text accom-
panying notes 19-29 infra for a discussion and examples of the Commission's involvement
in the Kentucky project.
7 KY. R. Civ. P. 88-97 [hereinafted cited as CR].
8 CR 89.
9 CR90 &95.
10 CR 91.
" CR93.
12 The original version of the special rules was approved for the Seventeenth Circuit
in the form of an administrative order which became effective on December 15, 1980. The
Special Rules adopted'by the Kentucky Supreme Court on September 10, 1982, became ef-
fective in Campbell County on that date.
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Twenty-first Circuit (Bath, Menifee, Montgomery and Rowan
Counties) ' and the Sixteenth Division of the Thirtieth Circuit (a
portion of Louisville),14 the impact of the rules is already being
felt statewide. Attorneys whose main practices are in other cir-
cuits must follow the Special Rules when trying cases in these
three circuits. Furthermore, the Kentucky Supreme Court plans
to apply the Economical Litigation Docket to other circuits if the
results of this initial experiment continue to be favorable. 15 Thus,
the program may be implemented statewide within the next few
years. 16
Because of the significant procedural changes brought about
by the Special Rules and their potential statewide impact, Ken-
tucky practitioners must become familiar with the Ecoiomical
Litigation Docket. Consequently, this Note will focus upon the
procedural rules making up that docket and their significance to
Kentucky practice. In addition, this Note will provide a brief his-
tory of the combined efforts of the Action Commission and a
Kentucky advisory committee, which resulted in the implemen-
tation of the experimental program in Campbell County and the
adoption of the Special Rules. It will conclude with an evalua-
tion of the Kentucky Economical Litigation Docket, its strengths
and weaknesses and its potential for statewide implementation.
I. THE CAMPBELL COUNTY EXPERIMENT
In the spring of 1978, Chief Justice Palmore attended a con-
ference at which he became interested in the negative effects of
high costs and delay upon the court system and the legal profes-
sion.' 7 In 1980, after learning about a California experimental
13 The Special Rules were implemented in the Twenty-first Circuit on Oct. 1, 1982.
14 The Special Rules were implemented in the Sixteenth Division of the Thirtieth
Circuit on Nov. 1, 1982.
15 Interview with Pat Sims, Manager, Information & Statistics, and Mark Cavitt,
Information Analyst, Administrative Office of the Courts, in Frankfort, Kentucky (Oct.
7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Sims Interview].
16 Id. Both Sims and Cavitt indicated that it would be some time before the Special
Rules would be applied in circuits other than the Seventeenth, Twenty-first and Thirtieth.
Research data from those circuits must be compiled and analyzed before further action is
taken.
17 In the spring of 1978, Chief Justice Palmore attended the Williamsburg Confer-
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program which attacked high court costs and delay by limiting
discovery and placing deadlines upon some phases of litigation,
Chief Justice Palmore contacted the Action Commission to ask
for assistance in implementing a similar program in Kentucky. 8
Kentucky's experimental program began in the Campbell
County Circuit Court. 19 The experimental rules were almost
identical to the Special Rules recently adopted by the Kentucky
Supreme Court.20 However, "[t]o permit an objective assessment
of the effectiveness of the [experimental] rules, cases within the
target categories [contracts, personal injury, property rights/land
condemnation and termination of parental rights] were assigned
on a randomized basis to either the regular docket or the docket
ence entitled "State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future," where he was assigned to a group
discussion, "Courts and Community." Says Justice Palmore, "I-have not been the same
since. I tremble for the future of the legal profession, at least the profession as I have
known and loved it for the past 42 years." J. Palmore, supra note 2, at 1.
18 For an excellent explanation and analysis of the Action Commission's evaluation
of the Kentucky experiment, see Connolly & Planet, Controlling the Caseflow-Kentucky
Style, JuDcEs' J., Fall 1982, at 8-9.
The Action Commission evaluated the impact of the special rules by "studying the
length of time it took cases to be completed, the volume and nature of discovery activity,
and by interviewing key participants in the litigation (judges and lawyers)." Id. at 54.
19 As one Action Commission commentator explained:
[T]his two-judge court [the Campbell County Circuit Court] was an ideal
setting for testing a program whose aim was to reduce the delay and cost of
litigation, especially medium-sized litigation. The court has a diverse civil
caseload, reflecting the influence of Campbell County's suburban and rural
mix. Compared to other state circuit courts, its dockets were not back-
logged, allowing the judges to concentrate on new filings. That court was
also selected because the two judges, Chief Judge John A. Diskin and Judge
Thomas F. Schnorr, strongly supported the caseflow management concept
and wished to change the attorney-initiated control of the pace of that
court's civil docket.
The support of the bar and community also were important to this
endeavor. Judge Diskin, Judge Schnorr, and Clerk of the Court Ed Blau
were respected by the bar and community. The president of the Kentucky
State Bar at that time, Frank Benton III, who practices principally in
Campbell County Circuit Court, also was a strong supporter of the objec-
tives and concept of forceful caseflow management, as was the Campbell
County Bar Association.
Id. at 10-11.
20 The main differences between the Campbell County Rules and the new Special
Rules'are that the Campbell County Program included a control group for evaluation pur-
poses and that Rule 91, which provides for telephone conferences, has been added to the
new Special Rules. Sims Interview, supra note 15.
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with the streamlined procedures." 2' The Action Commission
agreed to evaluate the program's effect upon court costs, delay
and the quality of justice. 2
Overall, the Action Commission's evaluations of the project
have been highly favorable. First, the Commission noted a dra-
matic reduction in case life on the Special Rules docket.23 The
Special Rules also "appeared to have advanced some case closures
to earlier procedural stages."24 Second, the evidence suggests that
the "Special Rules do not require more judge time and do pro-
duce a dramatic reduction in the time attorneys must devote to
the litigation."2s Furthermore, the discovery limitations pro-
duced substantial savings in discovery costs. 26 Consequently, "at-
torneys reported passing on dollar savings to their non-contin-
gency clients in nearly all the special rules cases."2 7 Finally, the
Action Committee study indicates that the quality of justice did
not appear to have been adversely affected. 2 In fact, since reduc-
ing court costs and delay presumably improve the quality of jus-
21 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE CAMPBELL COUNTY ECONOMICAL
LITIGATION PROJECT: A SUMMARY OF FIRST YEAR OPERATIONS 1 (1982).
2 Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 11.
23 Id. at 54. The dates indicated that the total case life was reduced by an average of
11 months. Furthermore, the length of time for every major litigation phase was short-
ened: "pleadings were completed one and one-third months earlier; discovery ten months
earlier; pre-trial six and one-half months earlier; and trial one and one-third months
earlier." Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 12. As former Chief Justice Palmore reasoned:
[I]f we can cut time down the cost [to the client] will be less. If a case that is
now in a lawyer's office for two years can be processed in eight months, the
lawyer should be able to handle it for a third of what he must now earn from
the case. He will not lose income, because he will be able to serve three times
as many clients. And the clients will be there, too. They just need to know
that they can afford it, and that the courts will give them prompt service.
J. Palmore, supra note 2, at 4.
26 Action Commission statistics showed that Special Rules cases evidenced an aver-
age of 1.1 fewer discovery filings per case than did regular rules cases. Special Rules cases
averaged 0.7 fewer notices of depositions and 0.3 fewer sets of interrogatories. And the
Special Rules cases averaged 26 fewer interrogatories per set served. Connolly & Planet,
supra note 18, at 55.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 56. The Action Commission limited its inquiry to "ascertaining whether the
reduction of litigation activity and delay brought about by the Special Rules had an ad-
verse impact on the ability of attorneys to prepare for trial." Id.
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tice, the Special Rules actually may have enhanced the quality of
justice within the Campbell County Circuit Court.29
Thus, the results of the two-year Campbell County experi-
ment are encouraging. Expecting to achieve similar results in
other circuits throughout the state, the Kentucky Supreme Court
adopted the Special Rules.
II. THE SPECIAL RULES: AN OVERVIEW
The Kentucky Supreme Court's approach to implementing
the Special Rules for the Economical Litigation Docket is unique
in both scope and method. The mandatory rules contain no
monetary threshold and apply to all cases falling within the spe-
cified categories. Furthermore, the rules are the first to combine
fast-tracking procedures with substantial limitations upon the
discovery process. 3 0
A. Scope
According to Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 89, the
economical litigation docket consists of all cases which substan-
tially involve contracts, personal injury, property damages,
property rights and the termination of parental rights.3' Unlike
the special rules adopted in Colorado, 32 the Kentucky special
rules apply to all cases falling within the specified scope. 3 By
9 Id.
30 Telephone interview with Paul Connolly, A.B.A. Action Commission to Reduce
Court Costs and Delay (Oct. 24, 1982). According to Connolly, Kentucky is the only state
to combine fast-tracking procedures and discovery limitations. Thus, the Action Commis-
sion is extremely interested in the results from the Kentucky program.
31 CR 89.
32 Under Colorado's special provisions, any party may "at any time file a written re-
quest that discovery in the case be governed by [the special provisions]." COLO. R. Civ. P.
26.1(a). If the request is opposed by another party, the court decides whether to apply the
special rules to the case. In making that determination, the court is to consider at least five
factors: the factual and legal issues involved; the extent and expense of the anticipated dis-
covery; the amount in controversy; the number of parties and their alignment with respect
to underlying claims and defenses; and the prejudical effect, if any, upon any party at trial
should the rules be applied. CoLo. R. Civ. P. 26.1(b).
"3 CR 89 provides that the economical litigation docket shall consist of all cases fall-
ing within the specified categories. Since the special rules apply automatically, there is no
[Vol. 71
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making the rules mandatory, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
insured that the program will be fairly tried in the state court sys-
tem instead of leaving the program to the mercy of state practi-
tioners who may initially hesitate to use the rules.
The Kentucky rules also differ from the mandatory rules
applied to certain superior courts under the California Econom-
ical Litigation Pilot Project34 because the Kentucky rules contain
no monetary threshold. By applying the docket to all claims, re-
gardless of their size, the Kentucky Supreme Court has elim-
inated at least one problem which occurred with the California
pilot project: practitioners who wished to circumvent the special
docket simply filed claims which exceeded the $25,000 threshold
amount.," The Kentucky docket effectively removes attorneys'
control over whether their cases are covered by the Special Rules.
Furthermore, the Kentucky rules contain no provision for the
withdrawal of cases from the special docket. California, on the
other hand, allows cases to be withdrawn upon a showing of
good cause. 36
B. Fast-Tracking Procedures
One of the main goals of the Special Rules is to shorten to
under six months the life of the average case subject to the rules. 37
need to request that a case be placed on the docket. Furthermore, the ability to avoid the
special litigation docket is also removed.
3 4 With certain exceptions, CAL. SUPER. CT. R. 1811(a) provides that the special rules
apply to all civil actions in which the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000. The
California pilot project was aimed at middle-sized cases. As one Los Angeles Superior
Court judge noted, small claims can be taken up at minimal costs in small claims courts
and large claims usually justify litigation if a settlement cannot be reached.
- But what about the case where the real amount in controversy is, say,
between $1,000 and $25,000? Unless the issues are very simple, the cost of
litigating even a just claim may just eat up most of the potential recovery.
On the other side, the cost of defending a marginal lawsuit may be so high
that the threatened party feels obliged to pay off rather than defend.
Epstein, supra note 1, at 10.
35 Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Norman L. Epstein observed:
While the ELP program is mandatory rather than elective-except for some
exempt cases-the practical operation of these rules in most cases is to per-
mit any party seeking affirmative relief to put the case in or outside the pro-
gram. The principal governing criterion is the amount in controversy.
For the superior court, a simple certification that the amount in con-
troversy is over $25,000 takes the case out of ELP.
Id. at 11-12.
36 See CAL. MUN. CT. R. 1711(c); CAL. SUPER. CT. R. 1811(c).
37 See Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 54.
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The docket attempts to achieve this objective by setting forth a
fast-tracking procedure which provides a definite time schedule
within which certain events must occur.
1. The Mandatory Discovery Conference
The fast-tracking procedure begins to operate on the date
when the last responsive pleading is served or could have been
served. CR 90 provides that a discovery and status conference
must be held within fifteen days of that date.- The discovery
status conference is essentially a planning conference39 in which
the trial judge meets with representatives of all of the parties40 to
schedule each event in the case and to determine the period of
time necessary to complete discovery.41
However, the conference serves an equally important pur-
pose, in that judicial control of the case is imposed at an early
stage. 42 A court-ordered discovery and litigation schedule con-
taining a completion date and either a final pre-trial conference
or trial date is issued at this time. 43 In addition, any motions for
exceptions to the special discovery rules must be made at this con-
38 CR 90(1).
39 See id. at comment.
40 CR 90(3). At least one commentator believes that all parties should be present at
the mandatory discovery conference:
Because the clients are familiar with the facts and the judge familiar with
the law, it is unlikely that the discussion will stray too far from the real issues
in the case. It is astounding how quickly the need for discovery can disap-
pear when the clients are there to hear what the lawyers are saying and to
correct any misstatements.
Grady, Finding Our Way Through the Discovery Jungle, JUDGES" J., Summer 1982, at 5,
7.
41 CR 90(1) & comment. John A. Diskin, chief judge of the Campbell County Cir-
cuit Court, explained his approach in the discovery conference:
Because I believe it is premature to discuss at this time factual or legal
issues-that being best left in the final pretrial conference-I concentrate on
ascertaining what discovery will be needed, what practical and legal prob-
lems are anticipated, how much time will be needed to schedule depositions,
and furnish information about documents.
Diskin, Kentucky's Special Rules, JUDGES' J., Fall 1980, at 10-11.
42 Sims Interview, supra note 15.
43 Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 13.
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ference. 44 Control of pre-trial activities thus has shifted from the
attorneys to the judge.
2. The Pre- Trial Activity Schedule
CR 90 sets forth a time schedule within which the main
events in the case must occur. A mandatory pre-trial conference
date must be set at the discovery conference. 4- The pre-trial con-
ference must be scheduled for no more than sixty days after the
discovery conference. 46 The exchange of information required by
CR 93 must be completed at least ten days prior to the pre-trial
conference. 47 Finally, a trial date must be set for no more than
thirty days after the pre-trial conference. 41 Thus, the rule con-
templates that a case will go to trial within 105 days (or 3 1/2
months) of the filing of the last responsive pleading.
If the time limits set forth in the fast-tracking procedure were
absolute, they could cause a number of additional problems. For
instance, 105 days might not be enough time to prepare suffi-
ciently for an extremely complex case. On the other hand, that
time period might be much longer than would be necessary to get
ready for a simple case. Fortunately, while the drafters of the
docket aimed the 105-day time period at the average case, they
recognized that some cases would require more or less prepara-
tion. Thus, CR 90 gives the trial judge discretion to extend or re-
duce the time limits to meet the needs of the individual case. 49
However, the rules specifically provide that any motion for an
extension of the time limits or for continuance must state the
reasons therefore and can be granted only upon a showing of
good cause. 50
Thus, the fast-tracking procedures set forth predictable but
flexible time limits during which both the attorneys and the
44 CR 90(2). However, while CR 90(2) allows exceptions, such are discouraged. Sims
Interview, supra note 15.
15 CR 95.
46 CR 90(1).
47 CR 93.04(1).
48 CR 90(1).
49 See Diskin, supra note 41, at 11.
50 CR 92(2).
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judge can prepare for trial. By permitting the trial judge to make
extensions or reductions at his or her discretion, but requiring a
showing of good cause for any motions to change the dates, the
rules allow the docket to meet the needs of the individual cases
but still move the cases along quickly. In addition, this speedier
pace and the cost of preparing for and attending the mandatory
discovery conference may increase the incentive for counsel to
reach an accord during the pleadings. 51
3. Telephone Conferences
Another innovation under the Special Rules is the availability
of telephone conferences. CR 91 provides that "[alt the discretion
of the trial judge, any motion may be heard and any conference
may be held by a telephone conference call among the trial judge
and counsel for the respective parties." 52
Several other jurisdictions already allow telephone confer-
ence options. 53 Judges using them have expressed favorable opin-
ions. 54 Of course, allowing both the judge and attorneys to hold
conferences, hear motions, etc. while remaining in their respec-
tive offices significantly reduces the amount of time and money
spent on a case, a saving that can then be passed on to the lit-
igant.55
4. The Pre-trial Conference
CR 95 provides for a mandatory pre-trial conference which
must be scheduled during the discovery conference. 5 The pri-
mary objective of the pre-trial conference is "to simplify the
issues, resolve pending procedural issues, dispose of summary
judgment motions, and insure the attorneys will be prepared to
51 Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 54.
52 CR 91.
53 See Middleton, supra note 3.
54 Superior Court Judge Philip Gruccio of Atlantic City, New Jersey claims that tele-
phone hearings are "not an experiment any longer." Middleton, supra note 3, at 1096.
"They make it possible to dispose of motions quickly and avoid the problem of having 'a
lawyer regurgitate what he or she has written in briefs.' "Id.
5 Id.
"o CR 95.
[Vol. 71
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make a crisp evidentiary presentation at trial."57 In addition, the
conference provides a final opportunity to push for settlement.58
Thus, the pre-trial conference provided for under the Special
Rules "is substantially for the same purpose as in any other
case." 59 The main difference is that CR 95 makes the conference
mandatory. °
C. Discovery under CR 93: The Court Takes the Reins
Fast-tracking procedures alone are not always sufficient to
prevent delay and reduce court costs. Even if the amount of time
allowed for pre-trial activity is limited, attorneys can still com-
pensate by putting additional lawyers and investigators to work.
And they can work around the clock if necessary so that, when
discovery is completed, the same mountains of paperwork have
accumulated. Obviously, this approach does nothing to reduce
the costs to the client. 61
As earlier experiments have shown, "[p]roperly limited and
controlled discovery is necessary in most civil litigation."6 How-
ever, many commentators argue that the discovery process is
now being severely abused.63 This problem was identified as a
major source of concern at the 1976 National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Jus-
tice (the Pound Conference):
There is a very real concern in the legal community that
the discovery process is now being overused. Wild fishing expe-
ditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery
57 Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 13. All "[m]otions for summary judgment
must be made ten (10) days prior to the pretrial conference." CR 92(3).
'8 Sims Interview, supra note 15.
'9 CR95 comment.60 ld.
61 Cost to the litigant can be reduced only if "attorney time" is reduced. If more at-
torneys are assigned to a case and the same amount of discovery is undertaken, attorney
time is not reduced at all. In fact, it may be increased. For a discussion by former Chief
Justice Palmore of the importance of cutting down attorney time, see note 25 supra.
62 Lundquist, supra note 2, at 1073.
r3 See, e.g., Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not
There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 597; Grady, supra note 40; Schroeder & Frank, Discov-
ery Reform: Long Road to Nowheresville, 68 A.B.A. J. 572 (1982).
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of admissible evidence is discoverable, seem to be the norm.
Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the individual, high
costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the dis-
covery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be
part of some lawyers' trial strategy.6
Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted CR 93, which is ex-
pected to eliminate abuse and overuse of the discovery process
but which will not hinder the attorney's ability to gather infor-
mation which is necessary to properly prepare a case.
1. Depositions
The traditional use of the deposition as a basic discovery de-
vice is severely limited by CR 93.01. Under that rule, depositions
by notice are limited to parties only. 66 The deposition of non-
party witnesses, however, is'permitted only by leave of court67 or
if the deposition is to be introduced at trial under the provisions
of CR 32.01. CR 32.01 provides that depositions of witnesses may
be used at trial if: 1) they are used for impeachment purposes;O
2) the witness will be unavailable to testify at trial; 69 or 3) the
depositions relate to certain kinds of testimony. Thus, CR 93.01
64 Erickson, supra note 2, at 288. In response, the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association set up the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse in 1977.
Lundquist, supra note 2, at 1071. This committee focused its attention on three goals: 1)
reducing the high costs of discovery; 2) proposing amendments to rules to deter the "mis-
use" of discovery; 3) preventing the "overuse" of discovery. Flegal & Umin, supra note 63,
at 598.
6 The effect of the experimental application of these rules upon the ability of attor-
neys in Campbell County to prepare their cases is discussed in notes 23-29 supra and ac-
companying text.
66 CR 93.01 & comment. CR 93.01 also requires the plaintiff to give his deposition
before any other discovery takes place. This gives the defendant a chance to examine the
plaintiff concerning the merits of the cause of action. Id.
67 CR 93.01 provides: "Except as otherwise ordered by the court, a deposition shall
be permitted only if it will be introduced at trial according to the provisions of Rule
32.01." (emphasis added). Any motion for an exception to CR 93.01 must be raised at the
discovery conference. CR 90(2) & 93.01 comment.
6 CR 32 .01(a).
69 CR 32.01(c).
70 CR 32.01(e). CR 43.04(1) states:
In all trials concerning alimony or divorce; the enforcement of a lien or
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eliminates the use of most discovery depositions but still provides
for the taking of evidentiary depositions of non-party witnesses.
2. Interrogatories
Leading the list as the most abused discovery mechanism,71
the use of interrogatories has become a major target for the pro-
ponents of discovery reform. 72 "The ease with which written in-
terrogatories can be generated and the proliferation of machine-
stored questions make this method of discovery uniquely suscep-
tible to abuse. '" 73
In addition to the ease with which they can be turned out, in-
terrogatories "en masse" tempt attorneys for two other reasons.
One involves the overuse of the mechanism; the other involves its
abuse. First, with the increase in suits for legal malpractice,
many attorneys believe that it is "[b]etter to ask everything that
could conceivably relate to the case-to leave no pebble un-
turned-than to risk a post-hoc assessment that an unasked ques-
tion might have revealed a decisive nugget of information." 74
Certainly, no one can blame an attorney for wanting to "play it
safe." However, the second reason for the extensive use of inter-
rogatories does not involve such an excusable motive. Pages of in-
terrogatories can be served daily to irritate the opposing side and
to buy extra time.75 If the ultimate goal of the court system is to
achieve justice, such methods can hardly be embraced.
The Litigation Section of the American Bar Association has
long encouraged both state and federal courts to limit the num-
ber of interrogatories allowed. 76 At least twenty federal district
the satisfaction of a judgment; judicial sale; surcharge or accounting; settle-
ment of estates; the division of land; or the allotment of dower, the testi-
mony shall be taken by deposition, unless the court by order or by local rule
directs the testimony to be heard under oath and orally in open court.
71 Lundquist, supra note 2, at 1072.
72 See, e.g., Flegal & Umin, supra note 63, at 606; Lundquist, supra note 2, at 1072;
Schroeder & Frank, supra note 63, at 574; Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, ELP Revisited:
What Happened When Interrogatories Were Eliminated?, JUDCES' J., Summer 1982, at 8.
73 92 F.R.D. 137, 146 (1980).
74 Epstein, supra note 1, at 9.
75 An attorney can be subject to disciplinary action for employing such tactics.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1) (1981).
76 Schroeder & Frank, supra note 63, at 574.
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courts have already imposed such limitations.77 California even
went so far as to eliminate the use of interrogatories entirely in its
Economical Litigation Pilot Project.78 The Kentucky Supreme
Court agreed that the use of interrogatories must be restricted.
The Court adopted CR 93.02, which provides that "the interrog-
atories to any party shall not exceed twenty (20) in number, each
of which shall be limited to a single question.."79
CR 93.02 is likely to be one of the major points of dispute as
the Special Rules are implemented. The Campbell County Bar's
initial reaction to imposition of this limitation in December of
1980 was one of outrage and apprehension. 0 However, now that
the shock has worn away, most practitioners agree that the lim-
itations save time and money.8 '
Actually, these mandatory limitations may solve some prob-
lems for the conscientious attorney who wishes to provide his or
her client with the best possible representation. The numerical
limitations provide a justification for failing to look under every
pebble and prevent the lawyer from indulging in unethical be-
havior. Furthermore, the implementation of CR 93.04, which
provides for the mandatory exchange of certain information,8 2 is
intended to eliminate the need for lengthy interrogatories. 3
Finally, if for some reason additional interrogatories are abso-
77 The following federal district court rules allow no more than 30 interrogatories,
unless the parties agree to accept more or obtain the court's leave: Rule 230-1 (S.D. Cal.);
Rule 3.03(a) (M.D. Fla.); Rule 7.4 (S.D. Ga.); Rule 9(6) (N.D. Ill.); Rule 12(c) (S.D.
Ind.); Rule 15(d) (D. Kan.); Rule 6(B) (D. Md.); Rule 3(B) (D. Minn.); Rule C-12 (D.
Miss.); Rule 8 (E.D. Mo.); Rule 2(e) (W.D. Mo.; Rule 10(e) (D.N.M.); Rule 12(B)(4) S.D.
Tex.); Rule 26(d(1) (W.D. Tex.); Rule 11-1(A) (E.D. Va.); Rule 7(D (D. Wyo.).
Flegal & Umin, supra note 63, at 606 n.30. The Federal District Court of South Carolina
and the Federal District Court of Hawaii also have threshold limitations on the number of
interrogatories allowed without a court order. 1 BENDER'S FORMS OF DIsCOVERY, 660-61
(1981).
78 For a detailed analysis of the effect that the elimination of interrogatories had
upon the California justice system, see Weller, Ruhnka & Martin, supra note 72.
79 CR 93.02.
80 Sims Interview, supra note 15.
81 Id. In fact, Judge Diskin noted that "requests to propound more than 20 interrog-
atory questions are very rare." Diskin, supra note 41, at 11.
82 The mandatory exchange of information under CR 93.04 is discussed in notes 90-
102 infra and accompanying text.
83 Sims Interview, supra note 15.
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lutely necessary, CR 90(2) allows for exceptions to CR 93 to be
made at the discovery conference.8 Thus, the new rules elim-
inate the abuse of interrogatories but still provide a means for ob-
taining any information which is essential to proper trial prep-
aration.
3. Production of Documents and Inspection of Lands
Basically, CR 93.03 provides that procedures respecting the
production of documents and things and entry upon land for in-
spection and other purposes will continue to be governed by the
provisions of CR 34.- However, CR 93.03 sets a definite time
period within which these activities must occur. The party upon
whom the request is served must permit the inspection or copying
of documents or the entry upon land withinfifteen days after the
request is served unless an objection is filed within that period.8 6
Thus, CR 93.03 forces the speedy exchange of access to and in-
spection of evidence 7 and eliminates the temptation to stall the
discovery process by delaying response to such requests. Further-
more, the rule also requires any objections to the requests to be
filed within the fifteen-day period.88 By forcing the receiving
party to take some action within fifteen days of service of the re-
quest, CR 93.03 expedites this method of discovery and calls for
court intervention only upon objection. 89
4. The Mandatory Exchange of Information
Perhaps the most significant rule provided for in the Special
Rules for the Economical Litigation Docket is CR 93.04, which
8 CR 90(2).
8 CR 93.03. However, CR 93.03 appears to supersede paragraph two of CR 34.02
which states:.
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written re-
sponse within 30 days after the service of the request except that a defendant
may serve a response within 45 days after service of the summons upon that
defendant. The court may allow a shorter or longer time. The response shall
state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related ac-
tivities will be permitted as requested unless the request is objected to, in
which event the reasons for objection shall be stated.
CR 34.02(2).
86 CR 93.03.
87 Id. at comment.
8 CR 93.03.
89 Id. at comment.
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creates a new and mandatory discovery device. The rule requires
all parties to exchange certain information no later than ten days
before the pre-trial conference. 90 The material to be disclosed in-
cludes: the names, addresses and phone numbers of witnesses
who may be called at trial along with their statements or sum-
maries of their expected testimony;91 descriptions of physical evi-
dence 2 and copies of documents93 expected to be presented at
trial; a list of expert witnesses along with their qualifications and
summaries of the opinions to which they are expected to testify;
summaries of contentions of law95 and issues of law and fact;9 6
and offers of stipulation. 97 The rule requires that a copy of the in-
formation be filed with the court9 along with a certificate of
compliance.9 9 It also places each party under a continuing duty
to supplement the information. 100
Obviously, the preparation of this material will require a
great deal of time and effort. But, by requiring the parties to
automatically exchange this information without waiting for
specific requests,'10 the proponents of this rule expect to eliminate
the need for many of the other discovery devices traditionally
employed. "The emphasis is on the free exchange of information
between counsel as opposed to the more expensive and time-con-
suming discovery proceedings such as deposition. The exchange
'0 CR 93.04(1).91 CR 93.04(1) (a).
92 CR 93.04(1)(b).
93 CR 93.04(1)(c).
94 CR 93.04(1)(d). This provision actually increases the amount and type of informa-
tion that is discoverable with regard to expert witnesses to be called by the opposing side.
95 CR93.04(i)(e).
96 CR 93.04(1)(g).
97 CR 93.04(1)(). "Parties are required to refine issues that are to be tried in the
case. If an order of stipulation is rejected and the matter subsequently proved at trial, the
rejecting party shall be subject to sanctions according to Rule 96. CR 93.04(3).
98 CR 93.04(1).
99 CR 94 requires a certificate of compliance with CR 93 to be filed upon the com-
pletion of discovery.
10' CR 93.04(2).
101 Under the California Economical Litigation Pilot Project, this information is to
be provided upon request by an adverse party. See CAL. MUN. CT. R. 1721(a); CAL. SUPER.
CT. R. 1825(a).
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of this information prior to the pre-trial conference should pro-
mote the narrowing of issues and encourage settlements." 0 2
CONCLUSION
In adopting the Special Rules of the Circuit Court for the
Economical Litigation Docket, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
taken a giant step toward restoring the average Kentucky cit-
izen's access to the state court system. After the results achieved
in the two-year Campbell County Experiment, 10 3 there is every
reason to believe that the implementation of the Special Rules
will significantly reduce the high costs and delay which have af-
flicted the court system in recent years.
The success of the Special Rules can be attributed to the two-
pronged approach taken by the Kentucky Supreme Court. First,
the fast-tracking procedures set forth a flexible set of time limits
for pre-trial activity which provides both the attorneys and the
judge with a predictable time frame within which to prepare for
trial.' 4 This allows the cases to move along at an accelerated
pace, thus preventing any unnecessary delay. Second, placing
significant limitations upon the discovery process, as well as re-
quiring mandatory exchange of information, eliminates the
abuse and overuse of discovery devices yet still allows attorneys
to gather the material which is necessary to prepare their cases
properly. 105
It is important to remember that the program is still experi-
mental. As one Action Commission commentator has observed:
"[T]he true measure of the merit of any court reform program is,
however, its transferability beyond an initial court environ-
ment." 6 Prior to October of 1982, the program had been applied
in only one circuit. Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court made a
wise choice in limiting the application of the Special Rules to
102 CR 93.04 comment.
103 See notes 17-29 supra and accompanying text for an explanation of the Campbell
County Experiment and the results achieved.
104 The fast-tracking procedure is discussed in notes 37-60 supra and accompanying
text.
105 CR 93 is discussed in detail in notes 61-102 supra and accompanying text.
1W Connolly & Planet, supra note 18, at 56.
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only three circuits for the time being. Varying in size, types of
judges, support staffs and dockets, 0 7 the Seventeenth, Twenty-
first and Thirtieth Circuits should serve as adequate testing
grounds for the rules. The Court expects some differences in re-
sult to occur when the Special Rules are implemented in these
circuits.°5 By limiting the areas of application and by carefully
monitoring the results achieved in those circuits, the Court hopes
to perfect the program before implementing it statewide.
However, the Special Rules will probably be implemented
throughout the state over the next few years. As the past Chair-
man of the American Bar Association Section of Litigation recog-
nized, reform is inevitable. "The only question is whether that
reform will be forced on us through public outcry and disgust or
whether we can accept the historic responsibility of our profes-
sion and lead the way to improvement of the judicial system."' 1
The Special Rules achieve the reform that is so desperately
needed, but they also provide for the continued success and pros-
perity of the legal profession. As former Chief Justice Palmore
declared, the success of the Special Rules of the Circuit Court for
the Economical Litigation Docket
will depend, of course, on the understanding and cooperation
of the bar. The lawyers can make it or break it, but the respon-
sible, thoughtful members of the bar, those who have a care
for the profession of tomorrow, will recognize that what we
are striving for is not merely reform, but survival itself. 0
C. Lynn Oliver
107 These circuits were chosen because of their different characteristics. Sims Inter-
view, supra note 15.
108 Id. The effect of the rules upon Louisville attorneys" ability to prepare for trial
will be particularly interesting. A great deal of informal discovery took place in Campbell
County. This is not expected to occur in Louisville due to the size of the city and the large
number of attorneys practicing there. Id.
109 Lundquist, supra note 2, at 1073.
110 j. Palmore, supra note 2, at 6.
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